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IKTRODPCTIOH
"'Son of the soil' during the armed struggle "squatter1
after independence."1 The irony in this statement
encapsulates the predicament in which 'many ex-combatants2
find themselves in today, thirteen years after independence.
For most of the now destitute ex-combatants the liberation
struggle in Zimbabwe was " a revolution that lost its way"
because of the raw deal they got from the petit bourgeoisie
nationalist leadership when they were demobilised. For many
ex-combatants the refrain "MUCHANOGUTA kumushal" [there
will be plenty at home], made by politicians to instill
resilience during the struggle did not materialise. Whilst
more than 25000 ex-combatants have become progressively
destitute in Zimbabwe, the very people they put into power
and those who opportunistically leaped on to the bandwagon
of the liberation struggle have become oppressively rich.
This poignant contradiction starkly represents some of the
ambiguities of democracy and indeed to some extent the
futility of independence. In addressing these ambiguities
one needs to take cognizance of what seems to have become an
inherent nature of national liberation movements in Africa
and elsewhere. During the struggle for independence, the
masses are mobilised by the nationalist bourgeois leadership
and called upon to make supreme sacrifices to liberate the
country. But, as soon as they have fulfilled their
historical mission of leading the bourgeoisie to power they
are ungraciously discarded.
In current social and political discourse questions have
been raised in Zimbabwe about the hue and cry over the
predicament of ex-combatants as if other sections of society
e.g. peasants, are better off. This lends credence to Norma
J.Kriger's observation that internal peasant struggles after
the war were centred around new questions created by the
war, such as who had sacrificed resources for the guerrillas
and deserved compensation?3 It has been argued that ex-
combatants should not be treated differently or be given
preferential treatment to other social groups which
"equally" contributed to the successful execution of the
war. Ex-combatants, therefore, cannot claim to have
liberated Zimbabwe on their own.
The purpose of my paper is, therefore, to comprehensively
and critically explore the demobilisation process and its
impact on the ordinary ex-combatant who,, at the end of the
war, found himself without enough resources nor the
necessary social backup to reintegrate fully into the civil
1. Moto. June 1988, No. 71, p.6
2. Ex-combatant in this case means, "any person who
underwent military training and participated, consistently
and persistently, in the liberation struggle which occurred
in Zimbabwe between the 1 s t January 1962 and the 29 t n
February 1980, in connection with the bringing about of
Zimbabwe's independence on the 18 t n April, 1980". (as
defined by the War Veterans Act, 1992).
3. N.J. Krlgler.l Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices.
Cambridge, 1992, p.213
society he had struggled to liberate. The paper will address
the ex-fighters1 concerns, fears, crisis of expectations as
the measures they took to salvage their situation.
ZIMBABWE'S DEMOBILISATION EXERCISE: 1980-1982
In 1980, Zimbabwe's total military force stood at about
100 0004 of which about 70% were former guerrillas of the
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA, Zanu PF's
military wing) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
(ZIPRA, PF-Zapu's military wing) and Rhodesian army. The new
nation could ill-afford to maintain such a massive force in
the post-war period.- Therefore, the new Zimbabwe National
Army had to be reduced by about 36 000 men. It is common
knowledge that in 1980 the government inherited a war
shattered economy, high levels of unemployment and other
attendant politico-socio-economic problems. Besides, the new
government had to deal with the return and rehabilitation of
more than 256 000 refugees. Given this backdrop, it was
apparently clear that without a blueprint to ensure the
successful execution of such a monumental exercise
demobilisation and rehabilitation were bound to be an ordeal
to many ex-combatants. As a stop-gap measure the government
introduced a short-term "quick-fix" solution.
"Operation Seed"
Whilst the government was deliberating on the modalities to
be followed in creating a new national defence force it
introduced a large-scale programme for the reintegration of
the ex-combatants called "Operation Seed" (the Operation of
Soldiers Employed in Economic Development). Operation Seed
was aimed at encouraging the ex-combatants to "swop their
guns for picks and shovels" and to work on land acquired by
government for that purpose.
This Operation was not enthusiastically welcomed by the ex-
combatants. Although Operation Seed was presented as a
military exercise and as part of the struggle for national
prosperity, the ex-combatants perceived the whole exercise
as a ploy by the government to deny some of them a chance to
join the new Zimbabwe National Army. Operation Seed proved
to be a total failure because its objectives were not made
abundantly clear by its authors.
Ex-combatants viewed it with suspicion and there was nothing
in the programme to motivate them. The Rhodesian propaganda
machinery which was still intact played a significant role
in discrediting and misrepresenting the objectives of the
Operation. Rhodesians, for instance, propagated the idea
that the ex-combatants would simply be given seed and hoes
4. S.Moyo, "The Socio-Economic Status and Needs of Ex-
Combatants : The Case of Masvingo Province', A Z.I.D.S
Consultancy Report prepared for the Lutheran World
Federation (Harare), No.4, 1985, p.l
5. "Zimbabwe's liberators: the Guerrillas today", Univ. of
Cape Town, Afrosoc. Zimbabwe, 1981, p.42.
6." Zimbabwe's Liberators: the Guerrillas today", p.42
7. ibid.
and sent to the rural areas and left to their own devices.8
Such a presentation raised suspicion about the actual
objectives of the scheme among many ex-combatants. As a
result Operation Seed just fizzled out.
Integration into th« public atrviet
In 1981, the Government decided to integrate some ex-
guerrillas into the new Zimbabwe National Army and to
demobilise more than 36 000 people. It prepared a
demobilisation package which consisted of a demobilisation
allowance, technical training, and business advice. Each
demobilised combatant received $185 a month for up to two
years to enable them to reintegrate into civilian society.
This amounted to a "severance entitlement" of $4,400 over a
two year period.10 It has been estimated that by 1984 36 000
combatants had been demobilised and out of this number only
16 000 had obtained employment or training by 1985.xl In
1989, official government figures were as follows:
Total number of ex-combatants 70 000
Ex-combatants employed by 43 000
government and companies
(in military & security-related
jobs as policemen, prison officers
soldiers & security guards and
others as personnel officers,
civil servants etc)12
Ex-combatants who formed 14 000
co-operatives or went on for
further training
Unemployed ex-combatants 13 00013
It is with the last two categories that this paper is
concerned, as the number of unemployed ex-combatants
increased steadily to more than 25000, between 1981 and 1993
thereby making it a single social group whose common
problems warrant some analysis.
Th> Demobilisation P a w n t and Its Shortcomings
The government's demobilisation package, which in the words
of Albert Nyathi a former combatant was a "pitiful
alternative to Operation Seed" is in fact "notorious" for
falling far short of adequately preparing ex-combatants to
return to civil society. It was an impetuously designed
programme which overlooked the diverse socio-economic needs
of each and every demobilised combatant. Very little, if
anything, was done to assess the extent to which the society
8. ifeid..
9. Zimbabwe Project News Bulletin, No.10, Aug-Sept. 1981,
p. 19
10. Nyathi and Hoffman, Tomorrow is Built Today, p.60
11. Moyo, "The Socio-Economic Status and Needs of Ex-
combatants', p. 2
12. Sunday Mail. Aug.6 1989
13. Read On. July-Aug. 1990, p.14
at large was prepared to reabsorb them.14 Some ex-combatants
had practical problems such as not having a place they could
call home either because they had lost their families or
were simply not welcomed back. The manner in which the
demobilisation exercise was handled engendered a deep sense
of resentment and frustration among many ex-combatants.
One of the major complaints of the ex-combatants was about
the inadequacy of the demobilisation allowance they had
received between 1981 and 1982. To many an ex-combatant it
was a pittance. Pitted against the Poverty Datum Line
[PDL] 1 5 estimate of $128 in December, 198016, the income of
$185 they were given appears to be a lot of money. The PDL
estimate assumes that one already has "decent" shelter and a
few other basics. But, ex-combatants were people who had
just come from the "bush" and were starting a new life from
scratch. They, therefore, required more than just $185 to
meet their "objective" needs in order to live in a condition
of "basic physical health and social decency." Whilst ex-
combatants had their own expectations about the future and
of what the government was supposed to do for them, their
families looked up to them for an improvement to their
lives. To meet the compelling demands of social decency,
some ex-combatants used the $185 they received every month
to buy clothes. Some used it to pay school fees for their
children and young brothers. Very few managed to engage in
capital projects despite the government's encouragement to
the ex-combatants to form co-operatives.
THE IMPACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ON THE SOCIAL REINTEQRATIOH OF
EX-COMBATAMT8
Limitations in finding Employment
The problem of the social reintegration of many ex-
combatants was compounded by unemployment. It was not easy
for ex-combatants to secure gainful employment particularly
with the private sector. A couple of factors militated
against their ability to get jobs. A considerable number of
the unemployed ex-combatants lacked the necessary
educational requirements. Participation in the armed
struggle was not regarded as a qualification for employment,
although it was considered as an added advantage especially
in security-related jobs.
14. A pilot study of this kind was done by the Zimbabwe
Institute of Development Studies (ZIDS) which was contracted
not by the Government but by The Lutheran World Federation
to carry out a provincial back-ground study of the socio-
economic requirements of ex-combatants in Masvingo in 1985.
15. The PDL is defined as "The income required to satisfy
the minimum necessary consumption needs of a family of given
size and composition within a defined environment in a
condition of basic physical health and social decency." in
V.S.Cubitt, 1979 Supplement to The Urban Poverty Datum Line
in Rhodesia: A study of the Minimum Consumption Needs of
Families (19741. Faculty of Social Studies, University of
Zimbabwe, 1979, p.l
16.ibid.
At independence the government set the minimum educational
qualification for employment as a civil servant at 5
Ordinary Level (O-Level) passes, at the standard of C or
better. Although statistics are hard to come by it is not an
overstatement to say that many ex-combatants joined the
armed struggle before attaining O-Level certificates largely
because of the Rhodesian government's discriminatory
educational policy and also the fact that some left school
prematurely when they were recruited for training.17 The
government's "education for all" programme was churning out
thousands of better educated young people and ex-combatants
could not compete with them on the job-market.18
Ex-combatanta as Employes: Private Sector perceptions
The employment of ex-combatants in the private sector was a
very slow and closely-guarded process. This was because
there was a general antipathy within the private sector
towards the employment of ex-combatants. A government
proposal in 1989 to provide special subsidies to parastatals
and private companies that employed more than five percent
ex-combatants on their work force19 was not well received by
the latter. The private sector viewed this state
intervention as being incompatible with free market
economics. This proposal came at a time when businessman,
manufacturers, etc were hide-bound by a system of labour
laws and the statutory minimum wage requirements which they
perceived to have been mounted against them. The first
victims of this perception were ex-combatants because they
were seen as having been imposed by the government on the
private sector. Worse still it was thought they were capable
of "importing" revolutionary tendencies to the work-place.
The private sector was, therefore, "a no-go area for ex-
combatants", as one ex-combatant put it.
The Co-operative Movement; A Vehicle to social
Rehabilitation?
The government of Zimbabwe identified the concept of co-
operatives as an important vehicle, inter alia, towards the
full integration of demobilised combatants. Not only was it
going to serve as an avenue for this purpose but it was seen
as being in line with the government's socialist thrust. It
was also seen as a partial panacea to the unemployment
problem that prevailed in the country. The government
encouraged ex-combatants come up with proposals for viable
projects to form co-operatives. Once they had been approved
by the Demobilisation Directorate they could then be given a
lump sum of their demobilisation payments which would form
17. It was not easy to attain an ~0' Level certificate
before independence because Smith's settler-colonial
administration blocked the educational avenues for blacks to
advance beyond Grade Seven. This in its own right was a
contributory factor to the launching of the armed struggle.
lS.C.Stoneman and L.Cliffe, Zimbabwe;Politics. Economy and
Society. London, 1989, p.77
19. Sunday Mail. Aug. 6, 1989.
20. Arous. Feb.13, 1989
21. MQtO. NO.51, p.2
the initial capital for their proposed projects.
Furthermore, the government undertook to provide advisory
assistance "specifically tailored to the needs of ex-
combatants." It is important to take note of these promises
from the onset because most of the co-operative ventures
collapsed due to lack of assistance.
Initially, the idea of co-operatives was enthusiastically
welcomed by many ex-combatants. As from 1981 co-operatives
initiated by ex-combatants sprung up in various parts of the
country. A common characteristic was that some of these co-
operatives bore exhortative names i.e names which emphasized
the need for self-reliance and co-operation. These were, for
instance, Vukuzenzele [which means "Wake up and do it
yourself"] in Zvishavane, Simukai [stand up] in Seke south
of Harare, Shandisai Pfungwa [use your brains] n e8$
Marondera, Batsiranai [assist each other] in Shamva.22
Host of the co-operatives were engaged in the following
enterprises: crop, poultry and livestock production,
welding, trade, dress-making, carpentry, etc.23
But some co-operatives soon became a disappointment to many
ex-combatants as they were bedevilled, by some practical
problems. The first and probably the biggest problem that
faced agro-based co-operatives, in particular, in Zimbabwe
was drought. Between 1982 and 1984 Zimbabwe was afflicted by
a serious drought. This scourge had a devastating effect on
most of the seventy-two co-operatives established by ex-
combatants and affiliated to the Zimbabwe Producer and
Marketing Organisation [ZPMCO]. 4 Considerable damage was
done to crops and livestock. As most of the co-operatives
had invested all their resources in agricultural implements
they had nothing to fall back on. 2 5
According to Elphigio Vambe, production manager of Ruponeso
Co-operative near Headlands, newly established co-operatives
were the hardest hit.
"Drought has been a terrible blow in our young co-
operative society. Having recently settled and
struggling to reach a certain level of self-
reliance, this severe drought is going to hammer
us." 2 6
The situation at Vukuzenzele Co-operative in Zvishavane, for
disabled ex-combatants was equally worse. Its chairperson
Sly Hasuku said:
"The situation here is serious. Both our crops and
those of the people of the communal lands around
us are completely ruined. We had a small garden
22. Zimbabwe Project News Bulletin. No.27, May 1983,
pp.14-17
23. Moyo, ~The Socio-Economic Status and Needs of Ex-
combatants, p. 47
24. ZPMCO, described as "the mother of all progressive and
collective co-operatives in Zimbabwe" was launched in July
1982.
25. Zimbabwe Project News Bulletin. No.27, p.14
26. ibid.
which was our main source of vegetables for daily
consumption, but that too is finished because
Gwenyoka stream has dried up. So now we have
nothing."27
The drought, therefore, had a debilitating socio-economic
impact on ex-combatants. In these circumstances it was quite
obvious that no profits or high incomes could be realised.
Once the viability of co-operatives was threatened by the
severe drought there was a turn-over of some members from
co-operatives who ultimately joined the ranks of the
unemployed. This also saw some ex-combatants scrounging for
existence.
The other immediate problem faced by co-operatives
especially in Matebeleland was the dissident menace.
Although this was not a nation-wide problem it is important
to consider it as it directly and negatively affected the
reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian society. From
1981 some disgruntled ex-ZIPRA fighters left the army to
engage in terrorist activities in rural Matabeleland. The
government reacted by sending in the North-Korean trained
Fifth Brigade to eradicate the dissident elements.28 Both
the Brigade's search for the dissidents and the dissidents'
terrorist activities among the rural communities adversely
affected developmental projects such as the reconstruction
of roads and bridges.
Co-operatives, particularly those established by former
ZIPRA combatants, also fell victim to this political and
security-related problem between 1981 and 1987. The most
common problem was the harrassment of co-operative members
especially by the Fifth Brigade on allegations that because
they were ZIPRA ex-combatants they were bound to have a lot
of knowledge about the operations and activities of
dissidents. The other allegation was that co-operatives were
using their land to cache arms - an allegation that gained
currency when arms caches were discovered by the government
on the farms owned by ZAPU in 1982. The story of Mbuso, an
ex-combatant, is a classic case which graphically highlights
the harrassment.
At the time of demobilisation in 1982, Mbuso and his fellow
ex-combatants formed a farming co-operative about 20km
outside Bulawayo. He remained with the co-operative for two
years but had a nasty experience. He was the chairman of the
co-operative. He was arrested on several occasions on
allegations that he was a dissident. "I was arrested,
detained for some months, sometimes for weeks, sometimes for
days, beaten up and things like that," said Mbuso. But it
always turned out that there was no sufficient evidence to
incriminate him. His crime was that as a former combatant
and commander he had some knowledge about the activities of
dissidents. During one of their many "visits" to Mbuso's co-
operative, the security forces interrogated him:
27. ibid.
28. Stoneman, Zimbabwe: Politics. Economics and Society,
p.47
"What do you know about this armed cache, tell us,
especially since you were at Gwaai [assembly
point]. You were a commander there, you couldn't
fail to know what was happening, you are telling
us lies."29
The other members of the same co-operative were also
subjected to the same aggressive treatment. His decisive
moment came when he was detained for three months in 1984.
Finally, Mbuso decided to quit the co-operative. When he
left the other members followed suit.
Harrassment was not restricted to the co-operatives in
Matebeleland only but even those in other provinces once the
members were suspected to have had links with ZAPU. One such
victim was Simukai Collective Farming Co-operative Society
on the border of the Seke and Chihota communal lands in
Mashonaland East. The chairman, Andrew Nyathi and all the
other members were all ZIPRA ex-combatants. Their co-
operative was situated in the heart of a ZANU [PF]
stronghold. Although members of Simukai had publicly
distanced themselves from the dissidents this did not
exonerate them from suspicion and harrassment by government
security agents.31 Such treatment adversely affected their
operational efficiency as they lived in constant fear.
There were also other numerous constraints that vitiated the
growth and consolidation of co-operatives. In 1987, Judy
Acton, director of Zimbabwe Project noted that several of
the collective co-operatives that had been formed had gone
out of business.37 This could be attributed to under-
capitalisation. Despite the government's commitment to co-
operatives, it had minimal resources to establish co-
operative ventures which were highly competitive and
profitable.33 The "socialist -oriented" co-operatives that
were launched were not only crippled by the lack of adequate
capital as well as high overhead expenditure but they also
had to contend with small and large-scale firmly established
capitalist ventures. Futhermore, these co-operatives did not
meet the lending criteria of the big financial power-houses
as they lacked the requisite collateral security. Even the
establishment of new financial institutions, such as the
Zimbabwe Development Bank and the Small Enterprises
Development Corporation did not alleviate the problems1 of
infant co-operatives which would struggle to raise
sufficient profit to repay loans.34
Some of the constraints emanated from a lack of general
ancillary services which are central to the survival and
sustenance of co-operatives such as preferential credit
technical advice, pricing schemes, market contracts, foreign
29. Barnes, The Heroes'Struggle, p.11
30. ibid.
31. Nyathi & Hoffman, Tomorrow Is Built Today, p.108
32. Sunday Mail. 15 Feb. 1987
33. Moyo, ~The Socio-Economic Status and Needs of Ex-
combatants', p. 95
34. ibid, p.95
exchange etc.35 The general lack of technical know-how,
training and managerial skills, fraud, irresponsibility
among co-operative members, and lack of viable markets also
contributed to the their lack of success.
With limited government assistance, the poor perfomance of
co-operatives and the generally unfavourable economic
conditions the number of unemployed ex-combatants had risen
to 25 000 by 1988.37
Constraints that faced th« Social Intaaration of Female Ex-
combatants
In exploring the dynamics of the rehabilitation of ex-
combatants it is important to look at the gender dimension
and see how it accentuated the ordeal of social
reintegration. Whilst ex-combatants generally faced problems
of rehabilitation, female ex-combatants faced problems
associated with conservative traditional customary belief
about the social and marital position of women in Shona
society. The status of women in Zimbabwe was generally
subsumed to that of men in the household and in the
community especially before independence. Because of the
society's perception of the place of women, female ex-
combatants were more stigmatised than their male
counterparts after the liberation struggle.
Although female ex-combatants were accorded the returning
hero status as evidenced by the euphoric celebrations
throughout the country settling down to face the realities
of life was not easy. Those ex-combatants who wanted to be
married found the civilian men unenthusiastic to marry
them.38 Once a civilian man got to know that a certain woman
he had developed an interest in was an ex-combatant, he
would quickly withdraw. Female ex-combatants found it easy
to marry male ex-combatants with they shared more or less
similar experiences and a common understanding based on
their relationships during the armed struggle. A group of
female ex-combatants at a co-operative in Gweru disclosed
that they were all married to male ex-combatants and pointed
out that this was a clear reflection of the people's general
resentment towards ex-combatants. 9
There were some mixed real and imagined perceptions about
female ex-combatants prevalent in Zimbabwe at independence.
Some men were of the opinion that female ex-combatants were
too haughty to be married in spite of the fact that "even
among civilian women there are those who are born tough."4
Charles Cheveru was forced to 'ditch' her ex-combatant
girlfriend because he found it difficult to deal with "such
a wild lover". Cheveru stated that even though they loved
each other she never ceased to say,
35. ibid, p.95
36. Sunday Mail. 15 Feb. 1987
37. The Sunday Mail. March 27, 1988
38. Moto. No. 94, Nov. 1990, p.4
39. Moto. NO. 94, NOV. 1990, p.4
40. ibid.
10
"I can do without you," or "do not be playful with me.
She used to boss me around and would tell me about her
adventures during Chimurenga to intimidate me into
fearing her. She gave me many warnings about crushing
me if I failed to keep appointments."41
Although Cheveru does not explain why he was always bullied,
one gets the sense that when certain things where not
working in their favour they took recourse to their status
as ex-combatants to defend themselves or intimidate.
Others argued that because they had lived with men in the
bush "under all sorts of circumstances" they, therefore,
lacked decency and propriety. The popular belief was, "They
must have slept around a lot."42 Although there might have
been isolated cases of this nature it is important to point
out that there was a strict code of conduct that was
supposed to be observed by every combatant during the
guerrilla warfare. It was taboo to have a private affair
and those suspected could earn themselves up to forty-five
strokes.43 This, however, does not mean that love and
marriage were entirely forbidden. An ex-combatant called
Nyasha explained the proper procedure that had to be
followed if one wanted to get married:
"If you wanted to get married you had to do it
properly. You would go to the political commissar and
say you would like to get married. He would take your
details, your name, home, parents and so forth. Because
your parents would like to know how you got married,
that was very important. Then they would ask you
whether you were sure you wanted to get married. They
would give you time to consider and then, two weeks or
so after your requisition, they would come and say
"O.K., we've approved of your wedding, you can get
married."44
However, notwithstanding these generalisations about the
alleged wayward character of some female ex-combatants, the
majority were well behaved and dignified. It is by and large
people's uninformed perceptions which made it difficult for
female ex-combatants to integrate comfortably into the
society.
Although some female ex-combatants were employed in the
defence forces, in local authorities, in the public and
private sectors alongside their male-counterparts, they
represent a minority. The majority of female ex-combatants
are either married housewives or single women who are
presently struggling to eke out a living. These women like
their male-counterparts are very bitter about the way things
have gone since independence. Sithembiso, an ex-combatant
41. Sunday Mail. 6 Dec. 1981
42. ibid, p.5
43. Moto• No.94, Nov. 1990, p.5
44. Nyasha and Rose, 'Four Years of Armed Struggle in
Zimbabwe', in M.Davies, Third World - Second Sex: Women's
Struggles and National Liberation. Third World Women Speak
Out, Zed Books, London, p.104
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from Lupane, complained bitterly: "Those who called us to
fight no longer look at us. They made us leave school, but
wherever we go looking for jobs, they ask for "O1 and 'A'
levels."45 Sithembiso went on to touch on an ironic point
of discontent, "If we had been dissidents, perhaps we might
have been treated differently."46 This was a sarcastic
allusion to the sympathetic and preferential treatment
accorded to former dissidents who; following the unity
accord between Zanu-PF and PF-Zapu on 22 December 1987, were
given a lot of assistance by the government and some non-
governmental organisations to rehabilitate them.
Although the unemployed ex-combatants seem to have gone
through the same ordeal of rehabilitation, for female ex-
combatants it was a double ordeal whose nature was dictated
by erroneous assumptions and perceptions. The general lack
of concern for their welfare by the government prodded the
excombatants into forming an organisation to articulate
their grievances in one voice.
THE ZIMBABWE WAR VETERANS ASBOCIMIOMl 1989-1993
"Tha Association was foraad aftar wa had discovarad
that tha politicians who aada us what wa ara had
ditchad us."47
Since the time of demobilisation ex-combatants had never
boldly stood up to challenge established authority about
their social predicament. If anything, they were praised by
politicians for their discipline, tolerance and patience.
Non-constituency HP J.I.Hundermark said of the unemployed
ex-combatants:
"After all these years, having had the problems that
they got, the hardships that they faced, to still be
tolerant, so tolerant and patient as they are is indeed
most commendable. I salute them for this. They accepted
the advice from Government, from Members of Parliament
that we cannot help them immediately ,niB
Developments immediately before and after the 1989
Willowgate scandal49 showed that relations between the party
and the government on one hand and the jobless ex-
combatants, on the other were at an all-time-low. As if to
say "enough is enough", the ex-combatants launched an
association called the Zimbabwe War Veterans Association
[ZWVA] comprising former combatants from ZANLA and ZIPRA in
April 1989 so that they could manage their own affairs.
45. HQtO. No.94, Nov.1990, p.5
46. ibid.
47. MQtO. NOV., 1990, p.9
48. The Hansard. March 24, 1988, p.3176
49. The scandal involving the buying and selling of vehicles
by members of Parliament and cabinet ministers and thereby
constituting an abuse of privilege. The name of the scandal
took its cue from the Watergate scandal in America.
50. The Zimbabwe News. Jan.1990, p.25
12
Factors Leading to the formation of the ZWVA
The formation of the ZWVA was a reactive initiative taken by
ex-combatants when it had become abundantly clear that the
government had failed to assist them. It was also motivated
by the realisation that the society at large "was not fast
iff integrating ex-combatants and it failed to employ
them."51 An important feature of the ZWVA was that it was
not only formed to address the unemployment problems faced
by many ex-combatants, but also to act as a trade union by
catering for the interests of employed ex-combatants who
were increasingly victimised at their work places.52
However, its formation was met with suspicion by some
government and party officials.
Krige has argued that organisations of war veterans "pose a
threat to the legitimacy of a government that itself relies
on its war credentials for legitimacy.'53 This is true of
the Zimbabwe government, to some extent, given the kind of
bureaucratic interference in the formation of the
association. In spite of the fact that ZWVA was declared a
welfare and not a political organisation its formation
caused panic in government circles as it was launched
concurrently with the Zimbabwe Unity Movement [ZUM]. It
was suspected of having a hidden agenda. So it was that the
government increased its interest in the organisational
affairs of the association, presumably, to ensure that no
anti-government activities were planned.
The ZWVA and the War Veterans Bill
The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare unilaterally and
arbitrarily legislated for the welfare of the war veterans.
In July 1991, the Ministry drafted the War Veterans
Administration Bill and gave it to the war veterans for
review in December of that year. The war veterans were
infuriated by the manner in which this affair had been
handled. The lack of transparency in dealing with this issue
left them wondering what the real intentions of the Ministry
were. The war veterans snubbed the draft bill because of its
"excessive ministerial control" and Margaret Dongo, an ex-
combatant MP for Sunningdale, mobilised other ex-combatants
and set up a voluntary war veterans' committee to scrutinise
the bill and to come up with their own proposals.
They opposed the Bill because it did not "properly represent
their needs and invests too much power in the minister." It
entitled only the minister to decide the amount, nature and
duration of the assistance that was to be granted to
dependents of war veterans. The Bill also gave the minister
51. ibid.
52. ibid.
53. N.Krige, 'The politics of creating national heroes: the
search for political legitimacy and national identity',
cited in Cock, ~The Social Integration of Demobilised
Soldiers in Contemporary South Africa1, p.13
54. ZUM is a rival political party formed by Edgar Tekere in
1989, when he fell out of grace with ZANU [PF].
55. ibid.
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powers to appoint three of the five-member board which was
to act mainly in an advisory and supervisory capacity,
whilst the war veterans would appoint only two members.
Instead they wanted a very powerful seven-member "investment
and administration" board with three government appointees
and four chosen from war veterans. Whilst the voluntary war
veterans' committee was in favour of the establishment of a
war veterans'administration fund, they were opposed to the
idea that the fund be administered by the Minister of Labour
and Social Welfare with the aid of "a board and a powerful
commissioner and other civil servants." They, instead,
wanted the fund to be administered by the Minister of
Finance as this would, presumably, prevent bureaucratic red-
tape when the funds were required.55
The other objection was that the draft dealt only with
destitute and unemployed war veterans instead of all the ex-
combatants. This objection was motivated by the fact that
employed ex-combatants were mainly engaged in menial,
"survival" jobs which lacked future prospects.57 They
objected to the inclusion of the "screening" or "means
testing" mechanism in the bill. This mechanism was designed
to vet ex-combatants to ensure that they were bona fide war
veterans who deserved assistance. Much as these war
veterans desired to see the Bill become all-inclusive,
essentially this would mean that those ex-combatants who
were relatively living "comfortably" would have an unfair
advantage over those living in destitution and were
unemployed.
The struggle for economic independence and the struggle for
the most mundane basics, i.e. accommodation, food, land,
education and good health was high on the committee's
agenda. But this struggle would only be won if they acquired
the very sources of wealth - "factories, mines and farms"
for "that is what we fought for."59 In keeping with these
grandiose objectives, the committee's alternative version of
the Bill emphasised the need for the establishement of five
main types of assistance schemes that were specifically
aimed at economically empowering war veterans and to ensure
economic independence. These were:
(i) Land settlement;
(ii) Industrial, commercial mining, and service
industries and investment;
(iii) Professional, academic, technical and vocational
training;
(iv) Social benefits for veterans and their dependents;
and
(v) Financial assistance, including loans and grants
for development schemes and individuals. °
These proposals were in opposition to the Ministry's Bill
which emphasised the welfare needs of the ex-combatants
without encouraging their economic independence. At the end
56. ibid.
57. ibid.
58. ibid.
59. ibid.
60. ibid, p.18
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of the day a compromise War Veterans Act was promulgated in
July 1992.H It represented, to some extent, an amalgamation
of the proposals made by the Ministry of Labour and Social
Welfare and the War Veterans Association. Be that as it may,
the ZWVA made it clear that it wanted to see minimum
government intervention. "We only want the government to
intervene when the board fails to perform its duties.
Otherwise we will not tolerate too much government
intervention."62. said Charles Hungwe, the chairperson of the
ZWVA.
Th« "Ho-holda-barr«d" Encounter Bttw>n th« Pr«aid«nt and
the ZWVA
If the government had real or imagined fears about the
actual intentions of the formation of the veterans'
association this was somewhat confirmed by the no-holds-
barred encounter between President Robert Mugabe and the
ZWVA in Chinhoyi [where the armed struggle to liberate
Zimbabwe started] on April 25, 1992. Mugabe had been invited
as patron of the association to inaugurate the ZWVA.
Presumably by design, the President chose not to address
teething problems faced by ex-combatants and which they
expected him to deal with but criticised them for not taking
an active part in politics. He portrayed ex-combatants as
"armchair critics" who had to take the blame for their
predicament. 3
It was on this note that the President raised the ire of the
war veterans. Without mincing their words, they told the
President that his government was being run by "opportunists
and bourgeois elements" [in reference to some ministers and
senior government officials] who ensured the continued
marginalisation of war veterans.64 They argued that it was
because of these "bourgeois elements" that ex-combatants who
were interested in joining the hierarchy of ZANU [PF] always
found it difficult to do so. Some war veterans even
suggested that Mugabe should dismiss some of his ministers
who kept him uninformed aboutthe true state of affairs which
had led to a "deep-seated lethargy and complacency."
The President pleaded ignorancee of any barriers because he
had always thought that it was very easy to join the ranks
of the party. 6 The President could only advise the leaders
to draw up a blueprint for a new "revolutionary
leadership."6' President Mugabe's encounter with the war
veterans was a clear demonstration that the latter had lost
their patience with "all the empty political rhetoric" such
as the President had given them.
61. The War Veterans Act. 1992
62. Horizon. Feb. 1993, p.14
63. The Financial Gazette. April 30, 1992
64. Zimbabwe Report. Summer, 1992, p.5
65. J.N.Moyo, 'The Leadership Crisis in Zanu [PF] and the
Government1, The Financial Gazette. April 30, 1992
66. ibid.
67. Zimbabwe Report. Summer, 1992, p.5
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A few months later the President placed emphasis on the
benefits that would accrue to ex-combatants under the
proposed War Veterans Act. But even when the Bill had been
passed into law in July 1992, bureaucratic bungling
prevented its immediate application. It took more than a
year for it to be implimented because a war veterans'board
had to to installed first and approved by the President. In
spite of these delays, the war veterans demonstrated that
they were well organised and were raring to work by
submitting nearly 400 project proposals by February 1993.
But nothing could be done until the board was in place and
registration had been completed.68
ZANP fppi and the 2WVA
The simmering discontent among the war veterans also
explains why there was panic when they decided to form the
ZWVA. But where there are genuine problems and the people
affected decide to radically transform their social
conditions by organising themselves, politicians especially
in Zimbabwe, are quick to smell a rat and, rightly or
wrongly, allege that "right-wing forces" are operating
behind the scenes. Such an allegation was made by Nathan
Shamuyarira, the party's Secretary for Information and
Publicity [who is also the Minister of Foreign Affairs].
Shamuyarira stressed in October 1992 that there were some
right-wing forces who were manipulating the ex-combatants to
gain "political capital."
Shamuyarira's insensitive comment on the plight of ex-
combatants suns up the government's lukewarm, attitude
towards the latter. He declared that it was never the
intention of the government to create a "privileged class of
ex-combatants." He also pointed out that participation in
the armed liberation struggle was not compulsory but was a
voluntary decision by individual Zimbabweans. He added: "He
sacrificed in many ways to achieve our independence not
because we were going.to be given a job or money by anybody.
It was a personal commitment to a cause."69
Such statements left some ex-combatants in no doubt that the
party and the government were no longer concerned with their
plight. Shamuyarira's comments were tantamount to blaming
the war veterans for their predicament. As a result some
elements in the ZWVA strongly felt that their organisation
should not be affiliated to any political party, including
ZANU [PF] as this would compromise their main objectives.
Moreover, they felt that it was futile to be affiliated to
ZANU [PF], a party which had alienated them soon after
independence "and our existence is now giving the people we
liberated [Zanu (PF) chefs] sleepless nights."70 This view
vividly portrayed the wide chasm that existed between the
war veterans on one hand and the party and the government on
the other. This development did not augur well for the
future strength of the party for it was costly for ZANU [PF]
68. Horizon. Feb. 1993, p.15
69. ibid.
70. 1Dla., see also Moto. Nov. 1990, p.9
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to lose people upon whom it had depended for the successful
execution of the armed struggle.
However, the death of Mayor Urimbo, an ex-combatant and one
time party national commissar, in September, 1993, allegedly
in abject poverty demonstrated how sensitive an issue the
plight of ex-combatants had become. Urimbo's colleagues
accused the party and government for being ungrateful and
neglecting a man who had "faithfully" served them. The war
veterans seized this opportunity to remind the government,
once again, about the seriousness of their social
conditions.
Although Mayor Urimbo was declared a national hero ensuring
that his family would receive a tax-free pension to the tune
of $10 000 per annum, some war veterans argued and appealed
to the President that ex-combatants should be recognised
while they were still alive. Even The People's Voice. ZANU
PF's sycophantic weekly news-sheet criticised the move: "It
is an insult to the memory of those who fought for the
country's liberation for the nation only to remember their
sacrifices after they have died."72 This was an appeal to
the party and government to take the plight of ex-combatants
seriously.
CONCLOBIOM
This discussion has demonstrated the extent to which the
socio-economic requirements of ex-combatants, if not
adequately addressed, can become a hot-bed of political
tension. The tensions were accentuated by the sheer
arrogance of some "bourgeois-minded" elements in the
political , leadership who failed to appreciate the
seriousness and sensitivity of the ordeal ex-combatants went
through in their rehabilitation. There was, obviously, a
limit, to which the government could go in satisfactorily
rehabilitating its ex-combatants. There were other social
classes such as the peasantry, workers, refugees, etc. who
also needed immediate attention. The government's policies
on the rehabilitation of ex-combatants were rather general
in nature. Moyo's research on the socio-economic status and
need of ex-combatants, has shown that the major government
policy documents on transformation and re-integration of ex-
combatants, viz Growth With Equity; The Transitional
National Development Plan [Vols.I & II] and Demobilisation
within the Zimbabwean National Army. contain broad
statements of intent but do not spell out, for example, the
role to be played by the ex-combatants in society.73
Zimbabwe should, perhaps, consider itself fortunate that the
disenchanted war veterans did not consider destabilisation
as a means of twisting the arm of the government to compel
it to help them to be reabsorbed into civilian life. Their
potential for destabilising the country should' not only be
borne in mind but it must be checked. This option has not
71. The Herald. September 15, 1993
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73. Moyo, "The Socio-economic Status and Needs of Ex-
combatants', p. 92
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yet been considered because many realise the futility of
going to war and an ex-combatant called Mwakudza, probably
spoke for many when he said:
"We will never go to war again. For what? To fight
for someone to enjoy, while we suffer. All our
grievances show how much we have been
forgotten."74
South Africa's Ex-combatanta
This study is quite significant and relevant to the soldiers
of ANC's Umkhonto weSizwe [NK] and the PAC's Azanian
People's Liberation Army [APLA]. HK and APLA can draw a leaf
out of the book of the rehabilitation experiences of
Zimbabwe's excombatants. Now that a new democratic order is
in place in South Africa one wonders what the future of
those ex-fighters who will be left out of the conventional
security and military establishment, is going to be like.
There are a couple of questions that need to be posed, how
prepared are political organisations for the demobilisation
of its combatants and their reintegration into civil
society? Are the ex-combatants going to be accorded
preferential treatment and status? What sort of treatment
will they expect from their parties and the new government
of national unity? How will other social groups perceive
any attempts to assist ex-combatants as a special social
group, etc. In trying to answer these questions, it remains
to be seen whether the South African ex-combatant and the
government will both learn something from this historical
precedent. Or will the ANC behave like other nationalist
liberation movements elsewhere which mobilised people to
liberate the country but unceremoniously discarded them on
the day of a new dawn?
The demobilisation and the rehabilitation of combatants
. after a war are complementary exercises which, if not dealt
with systematically, can subvert the very basis of any
democracy.
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